By: Kelley Williams, Chair Bigger Pie Forum
(Photo courtesy of Bigger Pie Forum website)
The US Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) is in charge of flood control on the lower Mississippi River (1928 Flood Control Act). Congress gave it that job to prevent another disastrous 1927 flood. The Corps has spent billions on its Mississippi Rivers and Tributaries Project (MRTP). It is supposed to keep the largest future flood (Project Flood) inside the levees and pass it safely to the Gulf. But the Corps’ 2019 flow line study predicts levees will overtop again — in a lesser flood.
The reason: a sediment bottleneck just downstream of its Old River Control Complex (ORCC) above Baton Rouge. It slows the river’s discharge to the Gulf. This loss of flow capacity makes normal floods longer and higher. It makes high floods (e.g. 2011 and 2019) a brush with disaster.
The Corps knows it must remove the sediments to restore the river’s flow capacity. And it must address the cause of the sediments: the Sidney A. Murray Hydroelectric Plant. That privately owned plant has nothing to do with flood control. It is a skeleton in the Corps’ closet. Congress did not order it. But its sediment bottleneck jeopardizes two missions Congress did order: 1) prevent another disastrous flood (MRTP) and 2) prevent the Mississippi from changing course (ORCC). Who ordered the power plant?
It appears no one “ordered” it. Local Corps commanders (New Orleans District and Mississippi Valley Division) facilitated it and integrated it with ORCC’s operation under their authority and control.
However, dredging the sediments, shutting down the power plant, and compensating for flood damage it causes is beyond their authority and control. The Generals and Colonels who created the problem are long gone. Those who inherited it have massaged it and studied it and quietly passed it on. And publicly say more flooding inside the levees is due to more rain.
The genesis of the power plant is a license from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued in 1982. FERC had and has no flood control authority or mission. But promoters of the plant had financial and political clout. Did Corps commanders go with the political flow when they executed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 1989 integrating its operation with ORCC?
Corps commanders today find it increasingly hard to hide the real cause of more flooding. And to spin it as more rain. The 2011 flood showed that it’s the river’s loss of flow capacity. Its higher stages vs flow showed the Corps that its water control manuals were based on flow capacity that no longer existed. LSU’s Dr. Xu’s December 2017 paper showed why: massive sediment deposits below ORCC and a narrower and shallower Mississippi River channel. The loss of flow capacity means more flood for less rain. Corps commanders have known this since 2011.
In 2016 there was a step change in flood duration and damage (huge sand deposits in woods and fields) that told me and other landowners inside the levees that something had changed. I didn’t understand what and why until 2018 when Dr. Xu’s paper was reported. I asked the Corps to release more flow to the Gulf to reduce flooding. The Generals said “it’s more rain” and dithered. They are still dithering. Why won’t the Corps dredge the sediments and restore the river’s flow capacity? Why can’t it?
It does not seem to be a matter of command competence. It seems to be a matter of command mission and tenure. The Commanding General of the Mississippi River Commission (MRC) and the Mississippi Valley Division (MVD) directs the Corps flood control efforts. His/her tour of duty is 2-3 years. Their primary mission seems to be: preserve and defend the status quo. That’s what they are incentivized to do. They are not change agents. The Generals barely have time to understand what needs to be done before they move on to their next duty post. Changing the river takes decades.
“Show me the incentives, and I will show you the outcomes.” Charlie Munger’s pithy observation about human nature applies to Generals too.
If the incentive is to preserve the status quo and defend the Corps’ reputation, the outcome is not change. Change is not in the Generals’ job descriptions. As one told me when I asked him to send more flow down the Atchafalaya: “That change is above my pay grade.” He added that it would take motivated grassroots pressure to get Congress to make that change. He moved on 6 years ago.
It appears that dredging the sediments to restore flow capacity and removing the cause (the power plant) and preventing levees from overtopping is also above the Generals’ pay grade. That too will take motivated grassroots pressure and acts of Congress.
There will be plenty of motivated grassroots outrage if the levees do overtop as the Corps predicts or the Mississippi avulses down the Atchafalaya.
Too late then for the Corps and Congress to do what should be done now.